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THE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES AND THE
EFFECT OF THE FUTURES TRADING
PRACTICES ACT OF 1992
Rebecca Leon*
INTRODUCTION
What are derivatives and what should regulators do about them?
If you cannot answer this question, then you understand as much
about derivatives as many top financial executives.' Because so
few people understand the risks2 inherent in derivatives, many
believe that derivatives may be more effectively monitored by
regulatory agencies. As derivatives have recently been introduced
on foreign exchanges3 and over-the-counter ("OTC") markets4 at
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1995. The author wishes to thank Ron
Filler, Esq., Conrad Bahlke, Esq. and Richard Miller, Esq. for their assistance in
the preparation of this article.
Carol J. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 1994,
at 40.
2 "Risk" is the probability that an investment will earn the projected return.
R. J. SHOOK & ROBERT L. SHOOK, THE WALL STREET DICTIONARY 359 (1990).
' An "exchange" is "the physical location where brokers transact business
for their clients." Id. at 131. The Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT") is the
largest exchange for trading futures in the United States. Id. at 62.
' OTC markets are "widely scattered telecommunications networks through
which the buyers and sellers" of certain products can be brought together.
LAWRENCE J. GITMAN & MICHAEL D. JOEHNK, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTING
34 (4th ed. 1990). The OTC market is comprised of sophisticated end users,
typically corporations and sovereign entities who negotiate directly with
industrial corporations, financial institutions, or money center banks. (Money
center banks are located in one of the world's major financial centers and have
large lenders, money-market buyers and securities purchasers. SHOOK & SHOOK,
supra note 2, at 248.) OTC markets offer greater contractual freedom than orga-
nized exchanges because contracts are individually negotiated rather than
standardized. However, there is no clearinghouse (which is the place where deals
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an unprecedented rate, questions about derivatives regulation have
intensified.5
Derivative instruments are financial contracts which allow or
obligate the investor to buy or sell an underlying asset, such as
stocks, commodities,6 stock indexes,7 or currencies! Changes in
the underlying asset's value affect the value of the contract. When
a derivatives dealer, generally a large commercial bank or major
securities firm, enters into a contract, it transacts with an end user.
End users generally consist of "smaller banks, industrial companies,
insurers and other financial services firms, pension funds and
governmental units, such as municipalities."9 End users hedge °
market risks by investing in derivatives, which counter adverse
price movements." Additionally, end users can arbitrage 2
between members are executed and settled) guaranteeing payment by the other
party as there is with an organized exchange. The parties involved must trust
each other to honor the contractual obligations. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood
Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1465 (1993).
5 Hu, supra note 4, at 1457, 1458.
6 A "commodity" is a movable article of value that can be bought and sold.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (6th ed. 1990). Examples of commodities are
grains, oils, soybeans, cotton, all other goods and articles, and all services, rights
and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future
dealt. See 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (Supp. V 1993).
' A "stock index" is a measure of the value changes in a basket of similar
securities which is used to predict possible future price movements. SHOOK &
SHOOK, supra note 2, at 398. The Dow Jones Industrials Average and Standard
& Poor's 500 Index are examples of stock indexes.
8 Hu, supra note 4, at 1460, 1464. Some examples of derivative products are
futures, forwards, options, swaps and index participations.
9 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
10 A "hedge" is "a measure used to offset losses or potential losses." SHOOK
& SHOOK, supra note 2, at 180.
" Hu, supra note 4, at 1466. "Market risk" is the risk that prices fluctuate,
"with all movements being beyond the investor's control." SHOOK & SHOOK,
supra note 2, at 239. An example of effective hedging of market risks is in-
vesting in a derivative that rises in value if oil prices fall to insulate a sheikdom,
while investing in a derivative that rises along with oil prices will protect an
airline. Hu, supra note 4, at 1466.
2 "Arbitrage" is the buying and selling of stocks, foreign currency, precious
metals, bonds, or other commodities from one market to be sold at a profit on
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between the price of the derivative and the market price of the
underlying asset or between prices in different capital markets. 1
3
Furthermore, derivatives are useful because investments in
derivatives have lower transaction costs 4 than investments in the
underlying asset. 5 While derivatives have many functions,
hedging 6 is a major cause of regulatory concern. 7
Theoretically, the end user hedges risk, thereby transferring the
risk to the dealer. The dealer may hedge one contract with a second
dealer, who may hedge that contract with another contract and so
on.' 8 There are many global interconnections at the end of the line
that could lead to the remote, yet horrific threat of systemic risk,
the danger that trouble in one market might spread uncontrol-
lably. 9 If, for example, one major dealer defaults on its contracts,
other financial institutions could collapse because they fail to
receive an expected payment on the derivatives contract.
Ultimately, the taxpayers would assume the liability for the failure
a separate, but related market. SHOOK & SHOOK, supra note 2, at 15. For exam-
ple, if a derivative product which has oil as its underlying asset is selling at
$95.00 and the market price of oil is $100.00, an arbitrageur can make $5.00
with no risk if he buys the oil-based derivative and at the same time sells oil.
Essentially, the arbitrageur bought oil at $95.00 and sold the oil at $100.00.
Because both the $95.00 and $100.00 prices were available at the same time,
there was a guaranteed $5.00 profit.
13 Hu, supra note 4, at 1466.
"' "Transaction costs" are the costs associated with making an investment.
GITMAN & JOEHNK, supra note 4, at 53. The cost represents money paid on both
purchase and sale transactions to compensate the broker for executing the
transaction. Id.
IS Hu, supra note 4, at 1466.
16 See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text.
'7 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
'8 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
19 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41. Most central bankers agree that there is only
a small probability that mispricing derivative's risks could lead to a systemic
shock. John Plender, Through a Market, Darkly: Is the Fear That DerivativesAre
a Multi-Billion Accident Waiting to Happen Justified?, FIN. TIMES, May 27,
1994, at 17. Moreover, evidence suggests that derivatives actually have a
beneficial effect on underlying markets and may even reduce volatility in such
markets. Dennis Weatherstone, Coping with Change Through Derivatives, RISK
MGMT., July 19, 1994, at 50.
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of the derivatives industry." Concerns over derivatives and what
some consider inadequate disclosure on financial statements2' have
caused recent congressional response to derivatives. 22
20 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
2 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41. Derivatives are off balance sheet instruments.
Id. The balance sheet of a company which has invested in derivatives, may,
therefore, not provide an accurate picture of the company's financial situation.
22 Rep. James A. Leach of Iowa, the ranking Republican on the House
Banking Committee, introduced a bill that proposes the creation of a Federal
Derivatives Commission ("FDC") to exert extensive authority over derivatives
contracts. Loomis, supra note 1, at 41. It would be extremely difficult to create
the FDC. Perhaps the greatest problem would be determining over which existing
and new products the commission would have jurisdiction. Based on the defini-
tion that a derivative is an instrument which derives its value from an underlying
asset, a futures contract is a derivative. If futures contracts fall under the
jurisdiction of the FDC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
would be near extinction. Moreover, an additional commission with new policies
would undoubtedly chase products and investors, unable to determine what
regulations would be imposed on derivatives, further away from U.S. exchanges.
In May 1994, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report which is
designed to stimulate new forms of financial regulation. Rep. Henry Gonzalez
(D-Tex.) filed one bill and Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), chairman of the
House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee, filed a broader bill
affecting the regulation of derivatives. Loomis, supra note 1, at 41. Markey's bill
gives the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") oversight over
derivatives. John Connor & Stephen Power, Markey Bill Would Give SEC
Oversight Over Unregulated Derivatives Dealers, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1994,
at C22. More recently, the SEC began working with large securities firms to
develop voluntary standards of oversight for derivatives trading. Jeffrey Taylor
& Steven Lipin, SEC, Six Firms Work to Set Derivatives Rules, WALL ST. J.,
July 6, 1994, at C l.
These proposals have been fueled by recent losses in OTC derivatives at
large corporations. David Warsh, Derivatives: The Ball Is In Markey's Court,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 1994, at 33. For example, in April 1994 the U.S. firms
of Procter & Gamble Co. and Gibson Greetings, Inc. put recent losses of deriva-
tives at $102 million and $19.7 million, respectively. Richard Waters, Bankers
Trust Sees Cut In Use of Financial Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1994, at 39.
In addition, Japan's Kashima Oil Co. Ltd. reported $1.5 billion in derivatives
losses. Commodities and Derivatives: Risky World of Leveraged Swaps,
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 18, 1994, at 26. Earlier in 1994, Germany's
Metallgesellschaftuncovered more than $1 billion in derivatives losses. Id These
examples fail to make clear that for every loser of $1 million dollars in deriva-
tives transactions, there is a winner of $1 million on the other side of the trade.
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To ward off regulators, dealers have expended great resources
to perfect their risk management systems,23 thus allowing dealers
to avoid a collapse of the derivatives market.24 Regulators are
quick to recognize that there are great hedging benefits with deriva-
tives.25 Derivatives contracts are also an increasing source of
profits for dealers with growth rates of forty percent.26 In fact,
large profits from the trading of derivatives have helped banks
recover from troublesome loans to less developed countries, real
estate deals and highly leveraged companies.27
Although American commercial banks are currently the
These multinational corporations are merely upset that they made bad trades. Rita
Koselka, Safe When Used Properly, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1994, at 47, 48. These
corporations, and almost anyone who transacts in complex derivative products,
are either sophisticated enough or wealthy enough to hire experts to monitor their
derivatives transactions. Companies that reported earnings from derivatives in
1993 include: W.R. Grace & Co. ($20.3 million), Oglethorpe Power Corp. ($9.1
million), Coca-Cola Enterprises ($7 million), McDermott International ($7
million) and Schlumberger Industries ($5 million). Id. at 47. The government
must not step in and regulate to protect corporations that can protect themselves.
Unnecessary regulation stunts the growth of U.S. exchanges. See infra note 30
and accompanying text.
23 Loomis, supra note 1, at 42. Indeed, most of the large derivatives trading
institutions follow the risk management recommendations of the Group of 30
banking think-tank and have invested heavily in systems and skills. Plender,
supra note 19; see also Weatherstone, supra note 19, at 50.
24 Loomis, supra note 1, at 42. This does not mean that in-house monitoring
of derivatives trading is foolproof. At the investment house of Kidder, Peabody
& Co., Inc., one trader manipulated derivatives books to create nonexisting
profits to cover losses and bulk up his bonus. Douglas Frantz & Sylvia Nasar,
The Ghost in Kidder's Money-Making Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1994, at
DI. However, the Kidder situation resulted from the company's failure to
monitor a trader's activity with sufficient care, not from the risk associated with
derivatives transactions. Michael Siconolfi, Jettisoned: With Scandal Report Due
Today, Kidder Ousts Another Official, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1994, at Al. More-
over, while the risk of financial fraud is significant, it is neither unique to
derivatives nor is it likely to begin a trend which would collapse the financial
industry.
25 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
26 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
27 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
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worldwide leaders in derivative contracts,2" U.S. commodities
exchanges are failing to attract many derivatives because of onerous
regulatory restrictions. 2' The exchanges' competitiveness in
derivatives is directly affected by the regulatory constraints imposed
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") because:
As competition from abroad increases the availability of
substitutes ... it will be increasingly likely that a minor
tightening of regulation in the United States will result in
volume moving overseas.. . . One regulatory mistake can
be sufficient to create a permanent setback in global
28 Loomis, supra note 1, at 41.
29 "Exchanges ... face substantial entry barriers when they decide to
introduce a new product such as a new futures contract." Daniel R. Fischel,
Regulatory Conflict and Entry Regulation of New Futures Contracts, 59 J. Bus.
S85 (1986). For example, to get a new futures contract approved, parties must
file an application and pay a fee to the CFTC. The application must include (1)
a description of the cash market; (2) a justification of individual contract terms;
and (3) a stipulation of conformity to the cash market. First, the cash market
description must include information on the production and consumption of the
commodity, how the price is determined during different stages of marketing and
sufficient statistical data to show accurate historical patterns of production,
consumption and marketing. Second, in the justification section, the party must
include information on the existence of a deliverable supply of the commodity
which is not conducive to price manipulation or evidence that cash settlement
will not be subject to the same, a description of the relationship between delivery
months and cyclical variations of deliverable quantities of the commodity and,
when applicable, an analysis of the consistency of speculative position limits.
Finally, the application must stipulate that the terms of the proposed contract are
consistent with prevailing cash market practices or demonstrate why different
terms are necessary. 17 C.F.R. § 5 (1982).
One study showed that the average number of days from submission of a
contract to first comment is 124. After this period, it takes an average of 223
more days to get approval and another 41 days from approval until trading
begins. In total, it takes over one year, on average, to introduce a new product
onto a U.S. exchange. William Silber, Innovation, Competition, and New
Contract Design in Futures Markets, J. FUTURES MKTS. 143 (1981).
For example, the CME exemption application for Rolling Spot Contracts
(see supra note 130 and accompanying text) was made almost two years ago and
the CFTC still has not responded. Jeffrey Taylor, Politics Delays Naming of
Schapiro to Head CFTC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1994, at Cl, C14.
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competitiveness for U.S. financial services and products.
... No public purpose could possibly be served by driving
the large institutional users of our own well-established and
efficient exchanges into foreign hands."0
Many derivatives contracts are being introduced on OTC and
foreign markets. U.S. commodities exchanges must attract deriva-
tives 31 to compete with these markets.
32
Part I of this Note discusses the recent history of derivatives
regulation by focusing on the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA")
and relevant case law prior to the enactment of the Futures Trading
Practices Act of 1992 ("1992 Act"). 33 In part II, this Note ex-
plains the 1992 Act, its legislative history and its effect on the
regulation of derivative products. Finally, part III analyzes recent
interpretations of the 1992 Act and the implications of its effect on
derivative products. The author asserts that the 1992 Act has filled
a statutory gap by empowering the CFTC to exempt exchange-
traded derivatives from CEA regulation. If the CFTC fails to
exempt derivatives liberally from CEA regulation, U.S. exchanges
will continue to have difficulty competing with foreign and OTC
markets.
30 Christopher L. Culp, Stock Index Futures and Financial Market Reform:
Regulatory Failure or Regulatory Imperialism, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 517,
577 (1991).
31 Derivative products which are traded on exchanges generally have
standardized contractual terms and generate sufficient trading activity to support
a liquid market. Hu, supra note 4, at 1457, 1465. Options on futures contracts
are an example of a derivative traded on a commodities exchange.
32 See infra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text.
33 Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat.
3590. The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 is an amendment to the
Commodity Exchange Act.
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I. THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT PRIOR TO 1992
A. Futures Contracts
The CEA states that futures contracts 34 can only be lawfully
transacted through a member of a contract market,35 on a board
of trade,36 designated by the CFTC as a contract market.37 Under
the CEA, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate futures
transactions. 3' Derivatives that are not futures contracts may be
34 A futures contract is... a fungible promise to buy or sell a
particular commodity at a fixed date in the future. Futures
contracts are fungible because they have standard terms and
each side's obligations are guaranteed by a clearing house.
Contracts are entered into without prepayment, although the
markets and the clearing house will set margin to protect
their own interests. Trading occurs in 'the contract,' not in
the commodity.
CME v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936
(1990). Most futures contracts, except for those based on financial instruments,
may be performed by the delivery of a commodity. Unless the parties cancel
their obligations by buying or selling offsetting positions, as is often done, the
buyer must pay the price stated in the contract and the seller must deliver. Id
" A member of a contract market is "an individual, association, partnership,
corporation or trust owning or holding membership in or admitted to membership
representation on a contract market or given members' trading privileges." 7
U.S.C. § la(15) (Supp. V 1993). Boards of trade, such as the CBOT, are contract
markets for different contracts. Members of a board of trade are members of that
contract market.
A "contract market" is a market so designated by the CFTC in accordance
with 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
36 A board of trade is any exchange or association of persons, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, who are engaged in the business of buying or
selling any commodity or receiving the same for sale on consignment. 7 U.S.C.
§ la(1) (1992).
17 7 U.S.C. § 2a.
3" The CFTC has exclusivejurisdiction over"transactions involving contracts
of sale of a commodity for future delivery" traded on a contract market. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The CFTC, however, is not authorized to regulate
transactions in "foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of
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derivative securities,39 which are regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").
This jurisdictional conflict over derivatives between the CFTC
and the SEC creates uncertainty as to which regulations will be
applied to a new product,4" making it difficult to introduce
effectively new products on U.S. exchanges. Once it is determined
that a transaction constitutes a futures contract, the CEA imposes
regulatory burdens4' on the instrument which are not found on the
OTC and foreign markets. Consequently, U.S. commodities
exchanges are at a competitive disadvantage when introducing new
products. This disadvantage has led to a strong increase in the
introduction of derivative products on the OTC markets42 and
overseas exchanges rather than on U.S. commodities exchanges.43
B. Index Participations
Once the CFTC or a court determines that a derivative instru-
ment falls under the jurisdiction of the CFTC, dealers and end users
must endure regulatory burdens which may make it more desirable
for the dealer to introduce the product on the less-regulated OTC
installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or
mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve
the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." 7 U.S.C. § 2.
" "Derivative securities" are securities which derive value from the price
behavior of an underlying financial asset. GITMAN & JOEHNK, supra note 4, at
464. Puts and calls are examples of derivative securities. Id A call option, for
example, is the right to buy a specified number of shares of stock, at a stated
price, before a defined date in exchange for a premium. The value of the option
is "derived" from the value of the stock. The value of the option rises as the
value of the stock rises. SHOOK & SHOOK, supra note 2, at 50.
40 See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
42 Innovation has been particularly strong in the OTC derivatives market,
which has seen enormous growth. The market for selected OTC derivatives
reached four trillion dollars by the end of 1991, which is eight times the 1986
level. Hu, supra note 4, at 1459.
4' Daily volume at the CBOT, for example, grew by only 95% from 1984-89
as compared to volume on foreign futures exchanges which grew by 300%. The
U.S. market share in the futures industry has declined from 80.6% to 70% since
1984. Culp, supra note 30, at 577.
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and foreign markets. In Chicago Mercantile Exchange v Securities
and Exchange Commission," several exchanges 45 applied to the
SEC for the right to trade different varieties of index participations
("IPs"). 46  Various parties, including two designated contract
markets, supported by the CFTC,47 requested that the SEC deny
the applications on the grounds that IPs were futures and outside
the jurisdiction of the SEC. The SEC, nevertheless, granted the
stock exchanges' request4" and trading of IPs began on the
Philadelphia and American Stock Exchanges. The Chicago Board
of Trade ("CBOT") 49  and Chicago Mercantile Exchange
("CME") 50 brought suit, seeking review of the SEC's decision.5'
The Seventh Circuit held that IPs are considered futures con-
tracts. 52
Relying on legislation passed after the Johnson-Shad
Agreement53 and on an earlier Seventh Circuit decision that
Government National Mortgage Association options54 are futures
44 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990).
4' The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., Options Clearing Corporation,
American Stock Exchange and Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. were
intervening-respondents in this case against the SEC. Id.
46 "Index Participations are contracts of indefinite duration based on the
value of a basket (index) of securities." Id.
4' The CME and the CBOT were the two designated contract markets in this
action. Id.
41 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Listing and
Trading of Index Participations, No. 34-26709, 54 Fed, Reg. 15,280 (1989).
49 See supra note 3.
'0 The CME is "the second largest commodities exchange in the United
States." SHOOK & SHOOK, supra note 2, at 62.
" CME v. SEC, 883 F. 2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936
(1990).
52 Id.
5' The Johnson-Shad Agreement, also known as the Shad-Johnson
Agreement, was an agreement between the CFTC and SEC which provided that
jurisdiction over options follow jurisdiction over the underlying instrument. The
CFTC received jurisdiction over options on futures contracts and the SEC
received jurisdiction over options on securities. Id. at 544.
14 The Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA") guarantees
securities backed by a pool of mortgages issued by private lenders. GNMA is
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. GNMA sold pass-
through certificates representing proceeds of mortgage notes and options written
330
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contracts, the court held that any instrument containing the
characteristics of both securities and futures contracts would fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.5 Therefore, IPs,
which have characteristics of both securities 6 and futures con-
tracts,57 must be exclusively regulated by the CFTC. This means
that IPs are subject to the onerous restrictions of the CEA and the
CFTC, including the lengthy application process required to in-
troduce a new product onto U.S. commodities exchanges.58 To
avoid these restrictions, no dealers applied to trade IPs on U.S.
contract markets, trading of IPs on U.S. securities exchanges
ceased5 9 and IPs were introduced in Toronto.6 °
C. Forwards versus Futures before the 1992 Act
A forward contract6' is similar to a futures contract, except
that the purpose of a forward is to enable businesses to buy
on them to allow hedging against interest rate changes. Board of. Trade of
Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
In the Board of Trade case, the court held that the agencies could not agree
to alter their jurisdiction as they did in the Johnson-Shad Agreement and that if
an instrument is both a security and a commodity, then the CFTC's jurisdiction
is exclusive. CME, 883 F.2d at 537, 544. The legislation implementing the
Johnson-Shad Agreement (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)10 (1982), 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) and 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1988)) left the courts determination in place.
Id.
" CME v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936
(1990).
56 IPs resemble an interest in a stock portfolio because they last indefinitely,
change in value with the market, pay dividends, are sold like stock and can be
used to secure margin and other loans. Id. at 545.
17 Sales of IPs have some of the characteristics of futures contracts. Sellers
of IPs pledge to pay the value of an index on a specified day. The IP has an
obligation to the clearing house rather than to the buyer. The IP may be settled
by an offsetting obligation after which the clearing house cancels both sides of
the transaction. Id.
58 See supra note 29.
'9 Culp, supra note 30, at 580.
60 Culp, supra note 30, at 581.
61 A forward contract is an agreement to buy an asset for future delivery at
a price determined today. SHOOK & SHOOK, supra note 2, at 155. Forwards are
traded on the OTC market and are not regulated by CEA.
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commodities from and sell commodities to each other.6 2 Unlike
futures contracts, forwards are not financial investments, but
instead, are a means to assist businesses in acquiring necessary
commodities.6 3 If it is determined that a derivative product is a
futures contract, even though the product was designed as a
forward contract, the product will be subject to the provisions of
the CEA and the CFTC. These unanticipated regulatory burdens
make it commercially impracticable to introduce the product on
U.S. exchanges.64
A forward contract entitles the parties involved to expect future
delivery of a commodity.65 Forwards are exempt from CFTC ju-
risdiction under the CEA 66 in order "to facilitate commodities
transactions within the commercial supply chain. ' '67 Exemption of
forwards from the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC is predicated
upon the actual, albeit future, delivery of the underlying
commodity.68 Contracts that are speculative in nature or used only
as investment tools (i.e., there is no contemplation of delivery by
the parties, are not considered forward contracts). 69 Courts have
found that it is not always easy to discern whether the parties
actually contemplated future delivery, and hence, whether the
contract is a forward contract.7"
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Co Petro
Marketing Group, Incorporated,7 the Ninth Circuit held that
where there is an obligation to perform offsetting agreements,
62 CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1982).
63 Id.
64 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
65 Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472,
1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
66 7 U.S.C. § 2 excludes contracts for the sale of any cash commodity for
deferred shipment or delivery.
67 See CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.
1982).
68 Transnor, 738 F. Supp. at 1490.
69 Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 573.
70 See, e.g., id.; Transnor, 738 F. Supp. 1472; CFTC v. Comercial Petrolera
Internacional S.A., [1980-82 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,222 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981).
7' 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).
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satisfying contractual duties without delivery, there is no contem-
plation of delivery and the contract is a futures contract, not a
forward. Similarly, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v
Comercial Petrolera Internacional S.A.," the district court held
that contracts to purchase a specified amount of oil at a fixed price
or to notify the broker to sell the oil contracts at the going price on
or before a specified future date were not forwards.73 The court
reasoned that having the right to sell the oil before the specified
date made delivery unnecessary.74 The court also found that
unnecessary delivery means that there is no clear intent of deliv-
ery.
75
Courts have consistently held that the lack of a forced burden
of delivery indicates a speculative transaction which is not a
forward contract.76 The delivery requirement was reexamined in
Transnor (Bermuda) Limited v B.P North America Petroleum,77
a case involving fifteen-day Brent oil contracts.7 In Transno, the
district court held that the mere opportunity to offset, coupled with
an expectation and common practice of offsetting, is sufficient to
deem a transaction a futures contract and not a forward. Because
most fifteen-day Brent oil contracts did not result in delivery and
offsetting was facilitated by the high degree of standardization of
terms, the court held that the investors, most of whom were
7 [1980-82 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,222 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 1981).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 25,098.
75 Id.
76 NRT Metals, Inc., v. Manhattan Metals Non-Ferrous, Ltd., 576 F. Supp.
1046, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (offsetting purchases disavow intentions of deliv-
ery); e.g., Habas v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,500 (CFTC 1987) (holding that a contract is a futures contract where
company literature implied opportunity to offset and the company permitted
offsetting before maturity of the contract).
77 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
7 Fifteen-day Brent oil contracts are contracts to deliver Brent oil in a future
month. In this case, the seller of the fifteen-day cargo had to give the purchaser
at least fifteen days notice of the three day period during the delivery month in
which the cargo must be lifted by the purchaser's vessel. CFTC Interpretation
Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188 (CFTC 1990).
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institutional, used the contracts for speculative purposes without
contemplating delivery.79 Thus, the court found that Brent oil
contracts were futures contracts.80
As futures contracts, both IPs and Brent oil contracts must be
traded on designated contract markets if they are to be traded in the
United States.8' Because investors take their business to exchanges
on which the products they seek are traded, any U.S. exchange's
loss of a product contributes to the decreasing U.S. market share
over exchange-traded instruments.8 2 Under the CEA before the
1992 Act, the sometimes long and costly process of establishing
jurisdiction and the unpredictability of the applicable regulations
discouraged the introduction of derivative products on U.S.
commodities exchanges.8 3 First, an unanticipated determination
that a product falls under CEA regulation could result in the
product no longer being financially worthwhile.8 4 Second, U.S.
exchanges lost money and the opportunity to attract new customers
by not carrying "desirable products. 85 IPs, for example, were
desirable because they were new products offering new risk-return
mixtures. Such mixtures are valuable to investors because they have
different attributes from the products already on the market, 6 thus
providing investors with greater flexibility to structure financing at
79 Transnor, 738 F. Supp. 1472.
80 Id.
" See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
82 CME v. SEC, 883 F. 2d 537, 549 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
936 (1990). The United States's competitiveness in world financial markets has
been threatened because trading firms either take their innovative products
overseas or do not offer new products to avoid the CEA's burdens and potential
litigation by futures exchanges. Additionally, when innovative products are
introduced in overseas markets rather than on U.S. exchanges, "[United States's]
participants lose control of the innovative process and sacrifice their self-determi-
nation." Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and
Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (1991).
83 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
" Legal disputes over new products have delayed the introduction of new
products, imposing costs on investors. See Culp, supra note 30, at 585.
85 See CME, 883 F.2d at 549.
86 Id.
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the lowest possible costs.8 7 Indeed, financial markets work best
when they offer every possible combination of risk and return so
that investors can construct a portfolio to meet their financial objec-
tives.8 Therefore, U.S. markets lost the ability to increase effec-
tiveness by offering greater investment alternatives. This loss could
have been avoided if there was greater certainty as to which regu-
lations would be applied to a new product.
II. THE STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE 1992 ACT
A. The 1992 Act
The 1992 Act substantially changed the CEA by adding a
provision which allows the CFTC to exempt products from the
CEA. 9 One purpose of the exemption is to promote financial
innovation and fair competition.9" The CFTC must interpret the
1992 Act liberally for U.S. exchanges to become more competitive.
Broad grants of exemptions will remove regulatory burdens and
encourage more products to be traded on these exchanges. While
the CFTC has used its exemptive authority in several cases, 91 it
has not yet determined whether it will grant the commodities
exchanges broad exemptions for derivative products.
B. Exclusions to CFTC Jurisdiction
In 1989, the CFTC recognized an exclusion for certain hybrid
C Gulp, supra note 30, at 585.
88 CME, 883 F.2d at 544.
'9 The exempt product must be consistent with the public interest, traded
only between "appropriate persons," (defined as knowledgeable or institutional
investors), and not have any material adverse'effects on the CFTC's regulatory
duties. The exemption also allows financial instrument to be exempt from any
and all parts of the CEA except § 2a, which delineates CFTC versus SEC
jurisdiction and gives the CFTC power to designate contract markets. 7 U.S.C.
§ 6(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
go Id.
91 Certain hybrids, swaps and energy contracts have been exempt. See infra
notes 93, 95, 142 and accompanying text.
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instruments92 that have some characteristics of futures contracts
and meet certain other specifications.9 3 Similarly, the CFTC ruled
that swap 94 transactions with specified characteristics were not fu-
tures contracts under the CEA.95 In 1990, the CFTC concluded
that certain commercial transactions, such as fifteen-day Brent oil
contracts, were excluded from CEA regulation.96 These decisions
show that the CFTC was authorized to exclude, though not exempt,
products from the CEA regulations even before the 1992 Act.
The difference between an exclusion and an exemption is that
92 A hybrid instrument, as used in this Note, is an equity, debt, or depository
instrument with one or more commodity-dependent components that have
payment features similar to commodity futures, commodity options contracts, or
a combination thereof. Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 17 C.F.R. § 34 (1993).
93 Hybrids are excluded if they are debt or depository instruments indexed
to a commodity at no greater than a one to one basis, limit the maximum loss on
the instrument, have a significant commodity-independent yield, do not have a
commodity component which is severable from the debt or depository
instrument, do not call for delivery of a commodity by means of the rules of a
designated contract market and are not marketed as being or having the
characteristics of a futures contract. CFTC Statutory Interpretation Concerning
Certain Hybrid Instruments, 54 Fed. Reg. 1139 (CFTC 1989).
9' A swap is "an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of cash
flows measured by different interest rates, exchange rates or prices with
payments calculated by reference to a principal payment." CFTC Policy
Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,695 (CFTC 1989).
9' To be excluded, the swap must (1) have material terms negotiated by the
parties, be based upon individual credit determinations and be documented in an
agreement that is not fully standardized; (2) create obligations that may be
terminated, absent default, only with the consent of the counterparty; (3) not be
supported by the credit of a clearing organization and not primarily or routinely
supported by a market-to-market margin and variation settlement system designed
to eliminate individualized credit risk; (4) be undertaken in conjunction with the
parties' line of business; and (5) not be marketed to the public. CFTC Policy
Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (CFTC 1989).
96 The CFTC held that fifteen-day Brent oil contracts that "are entered into
between commercial participants in connection with their business, which create
specific delivery obligations imposing substantial economic risks of a commercial
nature on these participants, but which may involve, in certain circumstances,
string or chain delivers ... are within the scope of § 2(a)(1)'s exclusion from
the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction." CFTC Interpretation Concerning
Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188 (CFTC 1990).
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an exempt product may be a futures contract,97 while an excluded
product may not.98 Congress considered exclusions to add unnec-
essary confusion to the issue of CFTC jurisdiction over new
products that were not clearly defined as futures contracts.99
Congress also found that this jurisdictional uncertainty possibly
inhibited the development of markets because many derivatives
instruments are useful to commerce and vital to maintaining the
competitiveness of U.S. markets in the global environment.' ° As
a result, Congress decided that the CFTC may exempt products
whether or not they have been classified as futures."' By giving
the CFTC broad power to grant exemptions from CEA regulation,
Congress and the judiciary will avoid having to determine the
jurisdiction for every new derivative instrument, as they were
forced to do with IPs, Brent oil contracts, swaps and hybrid
instruments.
C. IPs and Forwards: After the 1992 Act
Congress specifically considered IPs and Brent oil contracts
when determining the exemption provision of the 1992 Act.1 2
Ultimately, Congress did not decide whether IPs and forwards
should be exempt from the CEA; it left this decision to the
CFTC.
10 3
The 1992 Act contained a proposal that IPs approved or pro-
posed to the SEC before December 31, 1990, may be traded on
securities markets, and that all other IPs may be traded on futures
markets.' 4 While this delineation would have solved the jurisdic-
tional questions, it does not bring back the money and opportunity
97 Products are excluded because they do not fit into the statutory description
of 7 U.S.C. § 2. See supra note 38.
9' 7 U.S.C. § 6(c).
99 S. REP. No. 22, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3103, 3108.
100 Id.
101 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3179, 3208.
102 E.g., S. REP. No. 22 at 9; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 978 at 83.
103 7 U.S.C. § 6(c).
'04 S. REP. No. 22 at 10.
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lost by U.S. commodities exchanges when IPs ceased to be traded
on U.S. exchanges and were introduced in Toronto. More signifi-
cantly, this solution would cloud the jurisdictional issue over new
products by basing jurisdiction over a financial instrument on the
date of proposal rather than on whether the instrument is a security
or a futures contract. Congress, ultimately, did not pass the
proposed solution, leaving the court decision that IPs are futures
contracts intact. Under the enacted exemption provision, the CFTC
can now exempt IPs and other instruments traded among
institutional traders if it believes that such trading would be in the
public interest."°5 This provision can significantly reduce regula-
tory burdens and attract derivatives to U.S. exchanges. Unfor-
tunately, Congress passed nothing to help guide the CFTC and SEC
in determining which agency has jurisdiction over new derivative
products.
Similarly, Congress did not overturn either the court decision
that Brent oil contracts are futures,'0 6 or the CFTC interpretation
that Brent oil contracts are excluded from the CEA.10 7 Congress,
nevertheless, suggested that the CFTC should consider exempting
Brent oil contracts'0 " because such an exemption would settle the
opposing interpretations by the court and the CFTC.' °9 Further-
more, an exemption may be particularly appropriate for Brent oil
contracts because they are traded in other countries without CEA-
type restrictions."' Exemptions, such as one for Brent oil con-
tracts, will enable U.S. exchanges to compete with less regulated
foreign markets."' Congress also realized that the competitive
disadvantage suffered by U.S. commodities exchanges would be
diminished only by loosening the regulatory restraints on the
105 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
106 Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); see discussion supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
o7 CFTC Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg.
39,188 (CFTC 1990); see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
108 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 978 at 82.
109 See supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.




trading of derivative instruments. 112 The CFTC must follow
congressional intent and lessen regulatory burdens on derivatives by
using its exemptive authority broadly.
III. EXISTING AND PROPOSED EXEMPTIONS
A. Exemptions for Swaps and Hybrid Instruments
The CFTC has exercised its authority to exempt some
swaps"3 and hybrid instruments' 14 from most parts of the CEA.
These exemptions enable U.S. commodities exchanges to compete
in the trading of these products with OTC and foreign markets,
112 Id.
"' Swaps are exempt from all provisions of the CEA "(except in each case
the provisions of sections 2(a)(1)(B), 4b, 4o, . . . 6(c) and 9(a)(2) . . . to the
extent these provisions prohibit manipulation of the market price of any
commodity in interstate commerce or for future delivery on or subject to the
rules of any contract market)" provided the swap agreement (1) is entered into
solely between eligible swap participants; (2) is not part of a fungible class of
agreements with standardized material economic terms; (3) creditworthiness of
any potential obligee would be a material consideration in entering into or
determining the terms of the agreement; and (4) is not traded on or through a
multilateral transaction execution facility. Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17
C.F.R. § 35 (1993).
114 "A hybrid instrument is exempt from all provisions of the [CEA] ...
(except in each case section 2(A)(1)(B), provided" that (1) the instrument is an
equity or debt security or a demand deposit or transaction account offered by an
insured depository institution, an insured credit union, or a federal or state branch
or agency of a foreign bank; (2) the sum of the commodity-dependent values of
the commodity-dependent component is less than the commodity-independent
values of the commodity-independent component; (3) the instrument is not
marketed as a futures contract or a commodity option, except as necessary to
describe the instrument or comply with disclosure requirements; and (4) the
instrument is initially issued or sold subject to applicable federal or state
securities or banking laws to persons permitted thereunder to purchase or enter
into the hybrid instrument. Furthermore, the issuer must receive full payment of
the purchase price and the holder may not be required to make additional
payments to the issuer during the life of the instrument or at maturity. Finally,
settlement must not be in the form of a delivery instrument that is specified as
such in the rules of a designated contract market. 17 C.F.R. § 34 (1993).
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which do not place restrictions similar to those contained in the
CEA on these products.
Even though the CFTC had excluded certain swaps from
regulation in 1989, the 1990 Brent oil case"' raised fears among
traders that there would be similar rulings in the swaps area,"6
since Brent oil contracts are forward contracts according to the
CFTC' 17 and a swap is a forward-based derivative.18 The de-
termination by the court that Brent oil contracts are futures con-
tracts" 9 could mean that many swaps and other forward-based
products are also considered to be futures contracts, and thus
subject to CEA regulation. The proposed amendment to the CEA
excluded certain swaps from the CEA and directed the CFTC to
exempt other swaps. 2' The 1992 Act does not order the exemp-
tion of any swaps, but merely provides the CFTC with the authority
to exempt certain swaps.' 2 ' Nevertheless, this grant of authority
permits the CFTC to grant broad exemptions in the swaps area,
resulting in more trading efficiency on U.S. exchanges. 22
Similarly, Congress proposed a specific provision which
requires an exemption from the CEA for hybrid instruments if the
commodity-based portion of the return on the instrument is less
"5 Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
116 S. REP. No. 22 at 9.
7 See supra note 96.
"8 Two basic types of contracts are used to create a wide array of
derivatives: "option based products" and "forward based products." Hu, supra
note 4, at 1466-67.
"1' Transnor, 738 F. Supp. 1472.
120 S. REP. No. 22 at 9.
1' Swaps which may be considered futures can be exempt if they are not
part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to their material
economic terms. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(5)(B).
12 Swaps can be traded more efficiently post-exemption because the legal
uncertainty (that the agreements would be unenforceable) is removed. Removing
legal risk "should promote innovation in the swaps market by allowing
participants to negotiate and structure transactions that most effectively address
their economic needs." 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1993). Furthermore, the U.S. market will
be able to compete better with foreign markets which have not been plagued by
regulatory uncertainty as the U.S. market has. Id.
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than 50%.23 The 1992 Act, however, is broader than the pro-
posed provision because it does not contain the 50% requirement
and thus confers greater discretion on the CFTC to exempt hybrid
instruments. 124 Exempting hybrids from some or all of the CEA
will reduce regulatory restrictions imposed by the CEA, allowing
hybrids to be traded more efficiently on U.S. exchanges.
Subsequent to the 1992 Act, the CFTC exempted certain
swaps125 and hybrids 126 from the CEA. By granting these ex-
emptions, the CFTC recognized the U.S. regulatory system's failure
to both encourage new product innovation and facilitate entry of
new products into U.S. markets." 7 By granting more exemptions,
the CFTC will remove the obstacles which deter the introduction
of additional new products on U.S. exchanges. The CFTC has
recognized that wide-scale exemptions have a positive effect on the
competitiveness of U.S. exchanges and should therefore, be eager
to exempt novel derivative products.
B. Proposed Exemptions
Pursuant to the 1992 Act, the CME 128 and the CBOT 129
each submitted an application to the CFTC to have various futures
contracts exempt from the CEA. These applications share several
similar characteristics. The CME's application seeks an exemption
for "Rolling Spot Contracts"'30 traded by "Eligible Rolling Spot
123 S. REP. No. 22 at 61.
124 Hybrids which are predominantly securities or depository instruments and
which may be subject to regulation under the CEA may be exempt. 7 U.S.C.
§ 6(c)(5)(A).
125 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1993).
126 17 C.F.R. § 34 (1993).
127 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1993).
121 See supra note 50.
129 See supra note 3.
130 "Rolling Spot Contracts" are "Rolling Spot Futures Contracts"'T and
options on those contracts. An example of a Rolling Spot Contract is where on
Monday, A offers to buy foreign currency from B on Wednesday at $1.50 /. A
decides that he wants to hold his position one more day and hence roll the
position over until Thursday. A calls C and does a "spot/next" swap trade to
defer the purchase of pounds until Thursday. B agrees to the "spot/next" trade
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Participants. ,131 According to the CME, Rolling Spot Contracts
are similar to some instruments traded on OTC markets, and if
exempt, they receive the benefits of trading on a commodities
exchange without the concomitant regulatory burdens. 132
The CBOT, similarly, petitioned the CFTC for the establish-
ment of a "professional trading market exemption"'' 33 from the
CEA. This exemption would apply to trading in any instrument on
a board of trade, 34 provided the applicable board of trade sends
written notice to the CFTC, and the board of trade limits the
trading in exempt instruments to "professional traders."' 135 The
CBOT believes that a professional market exemption would afford
at $1.551. In effect, A is selling pounds that he would have received on
Wednesday at $1.501 and buying it back Thursday at $1.551. Exemptions for
Certain Exchange-Traded Futures and Options Contracts, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,422
(CFTC 1993). "The CME does not seek exemption from . . . sections 4b, 4o,
6(c), 6(d), 6c, 9(a), 9(b) [of the CEA]" prohibiting "fraud, embezzlement,
manipulation or attempted manipulation." The trades would still be cleared
through the CME clearing house. Exemptions for Certain Exchange-Traded
Futures and Options Contracts, 58 Fed Reg. 43,414 (CFTC 1993).
131 An "Eligible Rolling Spot Participant" is defined as a bank or trust
company; a savings association or credit union; an insurance company or foreign
person performing a similar role; a commodity pool, foreign person, corporation,
partnership, proprietorship, organization, trust or other entity not formed for the
sole purpose of becoming an eligible participant meeting specified financial
criteria; certain employee benefit plans or foreign persons performing a similar
role; a governmental entity; broker-dealers or foreign persons performing a
similar role who meet specified requirements; certain futures commission
merchants or foreign persons performing a similar role; any natural person with
over $10,000,000 in assets; or an exchange member at the CME. Each category
of persons is subject to additional limitations. Exemptions for Certain Exchange-
Traded Futures and Options Contracts, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,415 (CFTC 1993).
132 Benefits of exchange trading include reduced costs, price transparency
and counterparty credit exposure. Id. at 43,421.
... The CBOT sought an exemption from the entire CEA "(except section
2(a)(1)(B))." The petition further proposes that the CFTC adopt antimanipulation
and antifraud rules specifically for the transactions which become exempt under
this provision. The exempt transactions will also clear through a CFTC approved
clearing system. Id. at 43,415.
134 See supra note 36.
13' A "professional trader" is essentially the same as an "Eligible Rolling
Spot Participant." See supra note 131.
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OTC market users the benefits of exchange markets, 136 without
the burdens of general federal regulation, making it easier and less
expensive to engage in derivative transactions on U.S.
exchanges.137  The "professional market" and "Rolling Spot
Contracts" exemption proposals share two common characteristics:
(1) they provide exemptions from CEA regulation for institutional
or professional traders; and (2) they allow commodities exchanges
to compete with OTC and foreign markets in the trading of deriva-
tives.
Exemption from the CEA for institutional or "sophisticated
investors" is not a new concept. The definitions of "Eligible
Rolling Spot Participants" and "professional traders" under the
respective CME and CBOT exemption applications are extremely
similar to the definition of "appropriate persons" under the
exemption provision of the 1992 Act.3 8 Both proposed exemp-
tions, therefore, seem to comply with the exemption provision of
the CEA. This point is further supported by the decision in
Salomon Forex, Incorporated v Tauber,139 which provides an
exemption from the CEA for foreign currency futures which are
traded by "sophisticated investors."140 Moreover, the exemptions
136 See supra note 132.
"' Exemptions for Certain Exchange-Traded Futures and Options Contracts,
58 Fed. Reg. 43,416 (CFTC 1993).
138 Both the CBOT and CME exemption applications and section 6(c) of the
CEA list a bank or trust company, a savings association, an insurance company,
an investment company, a commodity pool, an employee benefit plan with assets
exceeding $1,000,000, a governmental entity, a broker-dealer, and a futures
commission merchant as eligible for exemptions. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) and supra notes
131 and 135 and accompanying text.
139 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993).
40 Id. at 979. The court held that professional investors may individually
negotiate sales of foreign currency futures off-exchanges without violating the
CEA. Foreign currency futures contracts are exempt from the CEA provided they
meet two requirements: (1) the futures are traded off-exchange; and (2) the
traders are "sophisticated." Id. This holding refers to foreign currency contracts
which the Treasury Amendment (7 U.S.C. § 2) excludes from CEA regulation.
However, before the Tauber case, foreign currency contracts which are futures
contracts have never been excluded from the requirement that they be exchange
traded. Id.
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of swaps"' and certain contracts involving energy products 42
by the CFTC are limited to contracts traded between institutional
or professional traders. Limiting the exemption proposals to these
sophisticated traders seems to conform with the CEA, a recent
court decision and previous CFTC exemptions.
The CFTC, in commenting on the exemption of energy
contracts, took the position that the exemption was in the public
interest because it reduced regulatory uncertainty.143 This exemp-
tion allowed participants to negotiate and structure contracts in a
manner most effectively suited to meet their economic needs,
thereby enhancing the global competitiveness of U.S.
businesses. 4 4 Exemptions will fulfill the congressional intent of
the 1992 Act and encourage the introduction of derivative products
on U.S. markets, making it easier for U.S. exchanges to compete
in the global marketplace.145
Moreover, the fears that exempt instruments will be unregulated
are unfounded because the boards of trade can themselves impose
regulations and act as self-regulatory organizations for the proposed
exempt futures contracts. 46 Exchanges will be motivated to self-
regulate in order to ensure the efficiency of the exchange, protect
the exchanges' customers and offer their customers competitive
benefits without substantial increase in risks. 47 In fact, the CME,
in its petition to the CFTC, stated that it intends to impose rules on
the Rolling Spot Contracts which will be less restrictive than the
CFTC rules but still protect key areas. The CME's rules seek to
141 See supra note 113.
142 Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg.
21,289 (CFTC 1993).
143 Id. at 21,292.
144 Id.
141 See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
146 Exemptions for Certain Exchange-TradedFutures and Options Contracts,
58 Fed. Reg. 43,427 (CFTC 1993).
147 Id. Competition is a substitute for regulation. The greater the competition
the more likely it is that exchanges will promulgate rules that benefit and protect
customers. Dennis Carlton, Futures Markets: Their Purpose Their History, 4 J.
FUTuREs MKTS. 259 (1984).
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make the benefits of the regulation outweigh the costs. 4 ' Because
the exchanges have ample business reasons to self-regulate,
exemptions from the CEA will not lead to unregulated exchange
transactions, but will result in self-regulation by exchanges thereby
allowing the exchanges to compete with OTC and foreign
exchanges, while keeping their customers satisfied.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the 1992 Act suggests that Congress
reacted to the U.S. exchanges' competitive disadvantage in ex-
change-traded derivatives contracts by granting the CFTC broad
jurisdiction to exempt derivative contracts from CEA regulation.
The new exemption provision of the 1992 Act provides the CFTC
with the ability to exempt IPs, Brent oil contracts and other types
of derivative contracts from the CEA. Because Congress merely
permits, but does not require the CFTC to grant exemptions, the
statute will have little effect unless the CFTC grants these exemp-
tions liberally. If the CFTC utilizes its exemptive authority, both
Congress and the courts will avoid classifying new products as
futures contracts.
Moreover, as a result of the 1992 Act, CEA restrictions no
longer necessarily discourage derivative products from entering
U.S. commodities exchanges. If the CFTC fails to grant broad
exemptions, U.S. markets will decline in competitiveness. This
decline will be attributed to the CFTC's inability to properly
interpret the legislative history of the 1992 Act which suggests
granting broad exemptions. In sum, U.S. commodities exchanges
will benefit if the CFTC grants broad exemptions allowing
competition and profit motive to mandate self-regulatory rules over
futures trading by sophisticated investors. The CFTC has not
determined whether it will take this course of action. Congress has
done its part. Now the CFTC must do its part.
148 Exemptions for Certain Exchange-TradedFutures and Options Contracts,
58 Fed. Reg. 43,427 (CFTC 1993).
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